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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the Court below correct in its holding

that the appellants1 alleged cause of action, which
according to the undisputed facts arose in 1973, was barred
by the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act?
2.

Is the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, and

the statute of limitations associated therewith, constitutional?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a suit initiated by appellants
(plaintiffs) on or about October 8, 1985, alleging medical
malpractice against respondents (defendants).

Plaintiffs claim

that the defendants committed malpractice more than twelve
years prior to the date the action was filed, but alleged that
the statute of limitations should be tolled because of the
provision in the Utah Health Care Malpiractice Act which
provides that if a health care provider affirmatively acts to
fraudulently conceal alleged misconduct/ the running of the
statute is tolled until such time as the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the alleged misconduct.
On or about December 16, 1985, defendant Garth
Myer, M.D., filed a motion to dismiss which was subsequently
treated by the lower court as a motion for summary judgment.
On or about December 17, 1985, defendants L. George Veasy,
M.D., Karen Bowman, R.N., and the hospital defendants moved for
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summary judgment and dismissal.

These motions were all heard

before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on February 5, 1986.
At that hearing, argument was heard from the
respective counsel.

Counsel for defendants argued that

plaintiffs' cause of action could not be sustained under the
statute of limitations provision of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.

Plaintiffs argued that the statute of

limitations should be tolled.

After hearing the arguments, the

matter was taken under advisement by Judge Wilkinson who
later granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and
dismissal.

Plaintiffs' appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jennifer Chapman was born on August 10, 1972, and
was treated for "blue spells" by doctors in Ogden for the
first five to seven months of her life.

She was then

referred to the Primary Children's Medical Center and was
admitted by defendant L. George Veasy, M.D.

(R. 8-9; A. 2.)

On or about February 14, 1973, an operation was
performed by a doctor who was not a named defendant to install
a "Waterston Shunt."

The purpose of that operation was to

increase the flow of blood to Jennifer's lungs.

The operation

"over-corrected" the initial problem and on February 28,
1973, a second operation was performed to modify the shunt.
(R. 9; A. 2-3.)
Although the second operation was successful,
Jennifer suffered a cardiac arrest a few hours after the
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operation.

Resuscitative efforts saved Jennifer's life, but it

was determined immediately thereafter that she had sustained
severe and irreversible brain damage.

Defendant Garth Myer,

M.D., first became acquainted with Jennifer and her family the
day following the cardiac arrest, and had no involvement
whatsoever in either the shunt operations or in any treatment
before or during the time the brain damage occurred.
In the months and years following Jennifer's cardiac
arrest in 1973, her parents (plaintiffs) had several
discussions and considerable correspondence with defendant
Veasy.

On several of those occasions, they alleged that

medical negligence during her hospital stay at the Primary
Children's Medical Center in February of 1973, caused her
condition.

These facts are supported by the affidavit of Dr.

Veasy and were not disputed by plaintiff in either the
court below or in their Appellant's Brief filed in this Court.
(A. 3; A. 7-8.)
Between November of 1977 and July of 1985, plaintiffs
conferred with at least five different attorneys before finding
their present counsel became involved.

None of the

above-mentioned attorneys filed suit or notices of intent to
commence a malpractice action.

(A. 8-9.)

After plaintiffs'

present counsel filed suit, counsel for defendants moved for
summary judgment alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs'
alleged causes of action were barred by the applicable statute
of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
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Act.

The Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor

of all defendants.

SUMMARY
Defendant Myers argues herein that he was not
involved in the alleged acts of negligence which plaintiffs
claim constitute the basis for their cause of action.
Defendant Myer was not involved in either of the operations
preceding Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest, nor in the
resuscitative efforts following that coronary arrest.

Indeed,

he did not become involved until the day after the coronary
arrest, after the brain damage suffered by Jennifer had already
been done.
Defendant further points out that clear and
convincing evidence exits that plaintiffs had considerable
correspondence with defendant Veasy in the months and years
following Jennifer's coronary arrest.

As testified to by Dr.

Veasy, the plaintiffs indicated to him that they felt
negligence on the part of the hospital and its staff was a
cause of Jennifer's brain damage.

Therefore, it is clear that

the plaintiffs did have notice of a possibility of a lawsuit
and the possibility of negligence on the part of hospital
employees, and cannot now claim that they were not aware of
facts to support the possibility of a lawsuit.
Defendant has also argued herein that although
plaintiffs have alleged that "defendants" acted to fraudulent
conceal information they needed to know of to initiate a
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lawsuit, they have only offered facts that tend to show they
spoke with one single defendant —

Dr. Veasy.

There are

absolutely no factual allegations whatsoever to support a claim
that defendant Myers did or said anything that could be
construed to be fraudulent concealment.

As discussed herein,

Utah courts have consistently held that in any action based on
fraud, the substance of the acts constituting the fraud must be
stated with particularity.

In this action, plaintiffs have not

suggested even one act committed by defendant Myer that might
have been fraudulent concealment.

In short, plaintiffs have

not supported a factual basis to support such a claim against
defendant Myer.
Finally, it is alleged herein that the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations do not
violate constitutional protections.

The cases that have

addressed this issue have clearly held that the act does not
deny rights protected by the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, nor does it unconstitutionally deprive minor
plaintiffs of access to the courts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT MYER DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN EITHER THE ALLEGED
NEGLIGENT ACTS OR THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT CLAIMED
BY PLAINTIFFS |.
In the present action, plaintiffs have claimed that
negligence on the part of the defendant hospital and its
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staff caused the brain damage suffered by Jennifer Chapman.
Plaintiffs claim that a heart-monitoring machine
malfunctioned or was improperly read in the hospital at the
time that Jennifer Chapman suffered a coronary arrest.
Plaintiffs allege that the delay in providing proper
resuscitative measures led to a lack of oxygen which
subsequently caused permanent brain damage.
Defendant Myer stresses to this Court that he was
not involved in either of the shunt operations, or with any of
the treatment or supervision at the time that Jennifer
Chapman suffered her coronary arrest.

Defendant did not even

become involved in this matter until the day following Jennifer
Chapman's coronary arrest.

By that time, the severe and

irreparable brain damage claimed by plaintiffs had already been
done.

Dr. Myer only treated Jennifer following the

discovery that she had apparently suffered the above-mentioned
damage.

Although this fact was stressed to the Court by

defendant Myer in a motion for summary disposition,
plaintiffs filed a response to that motion alleging that Dr.
Myer may still somehow be liable.
In their Appellants' Brief, plaintiffs have alleged
that "defendants misrepresented the cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries and the plaintiffs' family did not know of Jennifer
Chapman's 'legal injury' until July of 1984, and the statute
of limitations did not commence running until that time."
(Appellants' Brief at p. 14.)

This defendant asks the Court to

carefully review the pages following this allegation and to
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also review those affidavits submitted as support for
appellants1 brief.

On page 15, plaintiffs allege that they:

Had been told by the defendants that the
injuries were caused by blood clots and
unavoidable injury which was surely, in the
eyes of the Chapmans, an act tantamount
to an act of God. They were further
falsely1 told that the hospital records and
'tests confirmed these facts, and that Dr.
Veasy 'knew for a fact' that the blood
clots had caused her injury.
(pp. 15-16.)
However, the affidavit signed by Teresa Chapman
herself clearly states:
I believed that Dr. Veasy, the head of
cardiology at the defendant hospital, spoke
for the hospital as well as himself during
our meetings with him. He represented to
my husband and I that there were tests and
records which indicated that the cause of
our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or
shower of blood clots that flooded her
brain and that he 'knew for a fact' that
the blood clots had caused her injury. In
addition, he said that this event was
unavoidable and had nothing to do with any
negligence on the part of anyone.
Plaintiff further stated in her affidavit as follows:
These [hospital] records were therefore in
direct conflict with the statements of Dr.
Veasy to us.
In July of 1984, my husband and I
confronted Dr. Veasy about the medical
records and their conflict with his
previous statements to us. He replied that
the true cause of Jennifer's injuries had
never been established and he admitted that
his prior statements to us on this subject
were assumptions on his part and not the
result of tests which had been performed on
Jennifer.
As can be clearly seen, the only support which
plaintiffs claim as a basis for their Allegations that
-8-

information was fraudulently concealed are alleged statements
made by Dr. Veasy.

Nowhere, either in the affidavits

submitted by plaintiffs or in the memoranda filed with the
lower court and this court, do plaintiffs offer any factual
basis whatsoever as support for their allegation that defendant
Myer had anything to do with the alleged "fraudulent
concealment."

However, even though plaintiffs themselves admit

that only defendant Veasy made the statements they allege to
be "fraudulent concealment," they nonetheless continue to state
that:
Respondents informed Teresa and Robert
Chapman that hospital records and tests
indicated that Jennifer's brain damage was
due to unavoidable blood clots and could
not be attributed to the negligence of
anyone.
(Appellants1 Docketing Statement, p. 4.)

In short, there was

absolutely no proof whatsoever before the Court below that
defendant Myer did or said anything that could be construed
as fraudulent concealment.

Indeed, no evidence exits before

this Court that such is the case.

Plaintiffs cannot now, for

the first time, allege for the purposes of this appeal that
defendant Myer did indeed do something that might be
construed as concealment.
The "fraudulent concealment" exception to the statute
of limitations provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act clearly states as follows:
In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care provider
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
-9-

conceal the alleged misconduct, the claims
shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.
(U.C.A. §78-14-4(1)(b.)

As can clearly be seen by this

statute, it is not enough that a health care provider
affirmatively acts to conceal misconduct.

The statute requires

that the patient be prevented from discovering misconduct on
the part of a health care provider "because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
• . . ." As mentioned above, in the present action, the only
claims made by plaintiffs, and the only evidence and factual
allegations submitted to support such claims, indicate that the
only statements made which could possibly be construed as
"fraudulent concealment" were made by defendant Veasy, not by
defendant Myer.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT CLAIM FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT IN THIS ACTION.
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly
states that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated
with particularity."

(Emphasis added.)

The Utah Supreme Court

has interpreted this rule on several occasions. First,
plaintiffs cannot assert that the requirement of Rule 9(b) does
not apply to this action.

In the case of Williams v. State
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Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the above-cited rule and held as follows:
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms of
uncertain meaning. They are conclusions
that must be flushed out by elaboration and
by consideration of the context in which
they are used. This is why Rule 9(b)
requires that the circumstances
constituting fraud "shall be stated with
particularity" a requirement we have
construed to require allegation of the
substance of the acts constituting the
alleged wrong. The Rule 9(b) requirement
should not be understood as limited to
allegations of common-law fraud. The
purpose of that requirement dictates that
it reach all circumstances where the
pleader alleges the kind of
misrepresentations, omissions, or other
deceptions covered by the term "fraud" in
its broadest dimension. Consequently, if
the pleading had merely alleged that the
insured had given "fraudulent" or
"deceptive" or "misrepresenting" answers,
it would have been insufficient*
Id. at 972 (emphasis added.)

In the present action, it is

clear that Rule 9(b) applies.
This Court has also set forth other requirements for
cases containing allegations of fraudulent conduct.

In Pace

v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), the court
held that the "essential elements" of an action based on
fraudulent misrepresentations were:
(1) That a representation was made; (2)
Concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) Which was false; (4) Which the
representer either (a) knew to be false or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) For the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) That the other party, acting reasonably
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) Did in
fact rely upon it; (8) And was thereby
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induced to act; (9) To his injury and
damage.
(Id. at 274-75).
In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d
990 (1962), the Court added to this when it held:
It is to be1 noted that the tjerms
'fraud,'
'conspiracy and 'negligence1 are but
general accusations in the nature of
conclusions of the pleader. They will not
stand up against a motion to dismiss on
that ground. Basic facts must be set
forth with sufficient particularity to show
what facts are claimed to constitute such
charges.
Id. at 991.

(Emphasis added.)

In the present action, plaintiffs did not claim the
necessary elements of fraud.

Even if their general allegations

of "fraudulent concealment" could somehow be construed to
fulfill that requirement, none of the documents filed with the
Court meets the requirement that the "substance of the acts" be
set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are
claimed to constitute and support the allegations made.
Although the above-discussed deficiencies are true
as to all defendants, defendant Myer a^ain stresses that they
are especially true as to him.

No actp are set forth, and no

facts whatsoever are given to support plaintiffs' claim that
defendant Myer participated in fraudulent concealment.
Although plaintiffs attempt to use a catch-all that "the
defendants fraudulently concealed information," that claim is
not made specifically to defendant Myer and no facts
whatsoever are given to support such an allegation as to him.
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Therefore, the lower court's granting of defendant Myer's
motion to dismiss was completely proper.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THEIR POTENTIAL CLAIM.
Attached to this brief is a copy of a letter from
plaintiff Robert Chapman to defendant Veasy.

In that

letter, plaintiff acknowledges that "I am not seeking to
destroy any doctors or put a hospital out of business." Mr.
Chapman then continues as follows:
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified
medically or legally to answer all of the
questions pertaining to a malpractice
suite[sic]. The way I understand the law,
the burden of proof is on me to prove both
negligence and physical damage. The
negligence is obvious but to what extent
the physical damage can be linked to this
negligence, only a man of your medical
knowledge can know for sure. I do know
that besides being mentally and physically
handicaped[sic], Jennifer also has an
enlarged heart making it impossible for her
to ever lead any kind of normal active life
and eventually will be the cause of her
death. She was hurt and hurt bad because
of wrong decisions made in her early life.
(A. 17-18.)
This letter, written in 1977, clearly indicates that
Mr. Chapman felt at that time that the cause of his
daughter's handicaps was certain acts of negligence in her
early life.

In the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs,

they further stated:
About ten to fifteen minutes after leaving
Jennifer's room, I returned to visit her
again. Several nurses were in the room.
Jennifer looked peculiar to me but I
-13-

believed the nurses were on top of the
situation since they were standing with me
by her bedside observing her. One of the
nurses was working with the heart
monitoring machine which was attached to
Jennifer. The entire time I was in the
room, the nurse kept figiting with the
electrode leads on Jennifer's chest. After
ten to fifteen minutes had passed, the
nurse told me that an alarm on the heart
monitor machine was sounding. She told me
that the machine was not set properly and
that she would have to get someone to help
her set it. Before she left the room, I
asked her whether the anesthetic was making
Jennifer look peculiar. She then examined
Jennifer and told me that Jennifer was in
cardiac arrest. At that point, she
signaled for help and other doctors and
nurses arrived shortly.
(A. 21.)

It is clear that the plaintiffs felt something was

wrong at the time of the alleged negligence by the hospital and
its personnel.

As stated by the attached exhibit of defendant

Veasy, the plaintiffs had "many discussions and considerable
correspondence" with him during the months and years
immediately following the episode in 1973 which left her
impaired.

Dr. Veasy further testified that "on several

occasions they have alleged that medical negligence during her
hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center in
February of 1973, caused Jennifer's impaired condition."

(A.

7.)
Thus, from the facts of the case, the plaintiffs' own
admissions and the affidavit filed by defendant Veasy, it is
clear that plaintiffs were well aware of the facts which they
finally relied on in 1984, as a basis for their suit.
Defendant calls the Court's attention to the case of Reiser
v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1981), in which the plaintiff,
-14-

as the plaintiffs in this action have done, claimed that he was
not aware of the "legal injury" until after the statute of
limitations had run.

The court, however, held as follows:

Mr. Riser filed an affidavit wherein he
asserted a belief that his wife's disorders
were temporary and that he did not become
aware of any permanent damage until June,
1972. Such declaration of his belief was
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact.
Furthermore, the very acknowledgement that
his wife was suffering disorders as a
result of the incident (whether temporary
or permanent) would show that plaintiffs
should have known that they had suffered
legal injury at the time of the cardiac
arrest.
Id. at 100 (Emphasis added).
the exact case.

In the present action, such is

The plaintiffs1 affidavits acknowledge that

there was something "peculiar" before it was realized that
their daughter was in cardiac arrest, and further acknowledged
that they were informed of and knew that she had suffered a
cardiac arrest and had also suffered permanent and irreversible
brain damage.

That knowledge was had by plaintiffs

immediately after their daughter's cardiac arrest in 1973.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case is
barred under the clear provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ERRED IN CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED BY ESTOPPEL AND A CONTINUING
PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP.
On page 18 of their Appellants1 Brief, plaintiffs
have stated that under the doctrine of estoppel, defendants
should be "estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense."

Such a claim is completely

unsupported by either statute or case law.

By making such an

allegation, plaintiffs attempt to skirt the clear provisions of
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

That Act already

provides that:
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care provider
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claims
shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.
The above-cited statute fully incorporates the elements of
estoppel and takes into account that if there is fraudulent
concealment, the plaintiff has obviously relied on the acts of
the defendant to his or her detriment.
In their Appellants1 Brief, plaintiffs have cited to
the case of Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22,
456 P.2d 159 (1969), for the proposition that "a defendant is
estopped from pleading the statute of limitations where the
defendant has concealed the existence Of material facts which
-16-

would put the plaintiff on notice of a cause of action.11
Plaintiffs completely err in asserting that the facts of Rice
apply to the present matter.

In the Rice case, an insurance

adjuster for the defendant had contacted the plaintiff and
"advised her that she would be compensated for her damages as
soon as the costs thereof were ascertained."

The court also

noted that "she was reassured that the insurance company would
accept responsibility and that she was not to worry."

Id. at

161.
The court further explained that "the question of
whether negotiations for the compromise of a claim or debt will
give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of
limitations depends upon the character of the negotiations and
the circumstances surrounding the parties."

Id. at 163. The

court then cited to the case of North v. Culmer, 193 So. 2d
701 (Fla.App. 1967), where a court had held that "acts or
conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an estoppel
against pleading the statute of limitations."

Id.

In the present action, there was obviously no
"admission of liability" or "assurance that the defendants
would accept responsibility."

To the contrary, plaintiffs1 own

affidavits indicate that defendant Veasy informed them that
he did not feel their daughter's injuries were the result of
anyone's negligence.

The clear provisions of the Utah Health

Care Malpractice Act supersede any general notions of estoppel
and are clearly controlling in this case.
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The statute of

limitations in that Act clearly encompasses any and all
elements of estoppel that could be claimed by plaintiffs in
this action.
The plaintiffs also err in claiming that the statute
of limitations is tolled during a continuing relationship
between a patient and a physician.

Defendant Myer is unclear

whether this argument of plaintiffs applies to him since
plaintiffs, in their appellants' brief, have only stated that
"since it was uncontested that . . . the Chapmans maintained
physician/patient relationships with Dr. Veasy and the
hospital until March or April, 1985, this fact should have been
dispositive below since the statute of limitations under such
circumstances would not begin to run until March or April,
1985. . . . "

Because the physician/patient relationship

between defendant Myer and the Chapmans terminated much
earlier than the dates mentioned, defendant Myer assumes that
this argument does not apply to him.

however, to the extent

that plaintiffs might argue it does apply, defendant Myers
offers the following.
As support for plaintiffs' novel suggestion regarding
the tolling of a statute by a continuing physician/patient
relationship, plaintiffs have cited the case of Pateler v.
Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (193?).

Although the

Pateler case does discuss the effect of a continuing
patient/physician relationship, plaintiffs have misstated the
applicability of that case to the present action.
Pateler, the court specifically noted:
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In

From the time he undertook to treat the
case until he ceased to treat it, he, as
alleged, did so in a negligent and
unskillful manner. As alleged, the
treatments were not separate and distinct
acts, separate and distinct causes of
action. They constituted an entire course
of treatment of a case undertaken by
defendant to be treated by him, and the
whole thereof constituted but one cause of
action.
Id. at 249. As mentioned above, defendant Myer had
absolutely nothing to do with the operations or actions
preceding or during Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest.

His

actions were completely "separate and distinct acts" and cannot
be considered with the acts of other defendants to form "one
cause of action."
Defendant must strenuously object to plaintiffs1
claim that "tolling the statute of limitations during the
existence of this fiduciary relationship is in line with the
majority of jurisdictions . . . ."

Plaintiffs have cited 61

Am.Jur. 2d Physicians and Surgeons, §185, p. 312.
However, that annotation deals only with implied consent either
expressed or implied, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the
tolling of the statute of limitation by the existence of a
fiduciary relationship.

To the contrary, many cases have held

that such continuing treatment does not toll the statute of
limitations.
thereto.

See, 80 A.L.R. 2d 368, 385 and supplement

In any event, the principle suggested by plaintiffs

cannot apply where a plaintiff either discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury and voluntarily continues to be treated by the physician
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in question.

Furthermore, it is clear that this principle does

not apply to defendant Myer because the "continuing
relationship" principle only applies when the doctor who
continues the treatment was the one whc^ originally committed
acts of negligence.

As mentioned above, defendant Myer had

nothing to do with the alleged acts of negligence which
plaintiffs claim formed the basis for their cause of action in
this case.

POINT V
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DO NOT VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS.
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-4(2) does not deny
rights protected by the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Appellants in this action argue that the medical
malpractice statute of limitations is unconstitutional as
applied to minors.

In making this argument, the appellants

rely almost exclusively on the case of Scott v. School Board
of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 7^6 (Utah 1977).

While

the appellants admit that in response to the Scott decision,
the Utah Legislature amended the language of Section
78-14-4(2), they continue to argue that the amendment was to no
avail and that the statute should still be found
unconstitutional today.

This argument has been summarily

rejected by courts, including the United States District Court
for the District of Utah.

In Harqett v. Limberq, 598 F.

Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), the District Court stated that:
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The legislative history of this language
(Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-4(2))
indicates that it was added as an amendment
in direct response to the Utah court's
pronouncement in Scott of the general
policy favoring protection of the causes of
minors. In view of the express language of
the statute and the legislative history,
plaintiffs' argument that Mrs. Hargett's
discovery of the legal injury does not bar
Nathaniel's claim must be rejected.
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154.
The Hargett court went on to quote part of the
floor debate which resulted in the amendment to Section
78-14-4(2).

At the floor debate prior to the third reading of

H.B. 164, representative C. DeMont Judd stated:
[W]e come to you now with the amendment
which suggests that, despite what it says
in 78-4, it does not impact 78-12 which is
another area of the statute of limitations,
and so we are making that change in order
to overturn a Supreme Court decision which
has recently come down.
(Transcripts of discussion and vote in Utah House of
Representatives at third reading of H.B. 164
(February 13, 1979).
It is clear that the Utah Legislature's intent was to
put adults and infants on the same footing with respect to the
statute of limitations. As stated in Hargett, "it is
universally accepted that a legislature may put adults and
infants on the same footing with respect to statutes of
limitations without affecting constitutional rights." See,
e.g., Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 342 (Pa.Super. 1982); De
Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273 (Pa.Super. 1981); 51
Am.Jur.2d, Limitations of Action, Section 192 (1970).
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It must be noted that the Supreme Court of Utah has
recently rejected an attack based on the equal protection
clause similar to that made by the appellant in this case. In
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981),
the court set forth the test to be applied in making the
determination of whether a statute violates the equal
protection clause:
The test to be applied in making such a
determination is whether there exists a
rational basis to treat health care
providers differently from otpher alleged
tort-feasors.
Id. at 31.
The court further identified the general rule to be
applied in examining equal protection challenges to a statute:
As to discrimination: an act is never
unconstitutional because of discrimination
as long as there is some reasonable basis
for differentiation between classes which
is related to the purposes to be
accomplished by the act. And it applies
uniformly to all persons within the class.
Id. at 31, citing Hanson v. Public Employees
Retirement System, 246 P.2d 591 (Utah 1952).
When the Supreme Court applied these rules, it found
that:
The Act (Utah Health Care Malpractice Act)
was premised upon the need to protect and
insure the continued availability of health
care services to the public and not (as
asserted by the plaintiff) to shield
insurance companies from legitimate
claims. The Legislature exercised its
discretionary prerogative in determining
that the shortening of the statute of
limitations . . . would insure the
continued availability of adequate health
care services. In the absence of a showing
to the contrary, we conclude that the
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Legislature's determination is not so
arbitrary or unreasonable as to exceed
constitutional prohibitions.
Id. at 32.
In determining whether the questioned statute is
unconstitutional, the proper test for the standard of review is
the "rational basis test." Although appellants in this action
argue that the "strict scrutiny" test or the "heightened
scrutiny" test should be applied, the rational basis standard
of review has been used by the Utah Supreme Court in all prior
reviews of the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
See, e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635
P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) (cited in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661, 670 (Utah 1984)).

It is also the standard of review used

by nearly all other state appellate courts which have reviewed
the constitutionality of their own respective medical
malpractice statutes.

See American Bank & Trust Co. v.

Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n.10 (Cal. 1984).
(Citing 23 states and three federal circuits which have applied
rational basis standard of review.)

The "strict scrutiny" and

"means-focus" standards of review that plaintiffs urge the
court to adopt in this case are not applied to legislation
which does not create a "suspect class" or affect a
"fundamental constitutional right." Malan v. Lewis,
supra, at 674, n.17.
The same result was reached in Hargett v.
Limburg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), when the Honorable
Judge David K. Winder stated that "unlike alienage,
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illegitimacy or gender, the class of minors with medical
malpractice claims does not involve a fundamental interest or a
classification of a suspect character.

Moreover, a minor's

interest in redress for medical malpractice is not an interest
of "basic importance" as is the interest in an education
. . . ."

Id. at 154.
Accordingly, it is only necessary that the statute in

question be rationally related to the stated purpose of the
Legislature.

The express purpose for the malpractice notice

and limitation provisions is "to protect and insure the
continued availability of health care services to the public."
See Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.f 635 P.2d 30,
32 (Utah 1981).

The Legislature found an increasing trend in

the number of medical malpractice claims and the amount of
settlements and judgments.

That trend was causing malpractice

insurance premiums to increase to the extent that health care
providers were encouraged to practice defensive medicine.

The

legislature also found that health care services were
threatened by the possible unavailability of malpractice
insurance.

Consequently, the statute of limitations was

enacted, "to provide a reasonable time in which actions might
be commenced against health care providers while limiting the
time to a specific period for which professional liability
insurance premiums can be reasonably ahd accurately calculated
• . ." Allen, 635 P.2d at 32.
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As stated by Judge Winder in Hargett, 598 F.
Supp. at 156, "containment of that perceived crisis is
unquestionably a legitimate legislative objective."
While appellants in this action would have this Court
believe that the medical malpractice crisis never existed, such
is not the case.

The American Medical Association recently

indicated that:
There is a crisis in professional
liability, it will get worse if
comprehensive action is not taken . . .
The huge continuing increases in premiums,
suits and awards are significantly and
adversely affecting the cost and
availability of health care in the United
States. (Emphasis added.)
Responses of the AMA to the ATLA statements
Regarding the Professional Liability Crisis, AMA
Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance
(August 1985) .
The medical malpractice crisis is particularly acute
in specialized areas of medical practice.

These specialists

are being forced to restrict their services and reduce their
high-risk case loads which ultimately reduces the quality and
availability of health care. AMA Responses at 3.

Across

all specialties, three times as many claims are filed against
physicians as were filed ten years ago. AMA, Socio
Economic Monitoring Systems (1984): Malpractice, Balancing
the Issues, Ambulatory Care, p. 9 (June, 1985).
in every ten doctors is sued each year.

At least one

P. Danzon, The

Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 1
(1982).

The situation in Utah is even worse: an average of

thirty malpractice claims are presented each month.
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Utah

Department of Business Regulation Memorandum, Pre Litigation
Medical Malpractice Review (October, 1985 - April, 1986).
Accordingly, seventy percent of physicians now
indicate that they have altered their practice of medicine to
protect against lawsuits. AMA, Center for Health Policy
Research, (April 1985).

Current estimates indicate that

medical costs related to professional liability, including the
defense and medicine, accounted for twenty percent to
seventy-five percent of the 69 billion dollars spent on
physicians1 services in 1983. This amounts to 13.8 to 17.3
billion dollars. National Health Expenditures, 1983; Health
Care Financing and Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter of 1984.
Increases in malpractice awards also add to the already
startling medical malpractice crisis.
Furthermore, the extent of the current professional
liability crisis is most accurately revealed by current data,
indicating that average expenditures for professional liability
insurance arose by 44.8% between 1982 and 1984. American
Medical Association, Center for Health Policy Research,
1985.

The figure in Utah is significantly greater: two of the

major Utah medical professional liability insurers more than
doubled premium rates for physicians and surgeons between 1984
and 1985.

State of Utah Insurance Department Medical

Professional Liability Insurance Premium Revision and State
Paul Property and Liability Insurance Company Rate Increase
Filings, (December 7, 1984 and December 10, 1985) (reflecting
a 109.5% increase from 1984 to 1985; S|:ate of Utah Insurance
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Department Medical Professional Liability Insurance Premium
Rate Revision, UMIA Rate Increase Filings (January 27, 1984
to December 26, 1985) (reflecting a 109% increase from 1984 to
1985).
The extraordinary liability crisis coupled with huge
premium increases for physicians, is a problem effecting every
physician and patient.

In addressing this issue, the Kansas

Supreme Court concluded:
[L]ow-risk practitioners need high-risk
specialists in order to provide
comprehensive care for their patients.
Were insurance coverage unavailable for the
specialists in high-risk fields, the
evidence indicates these professionals
would either leave the state or would soon
quit the practice, causing a general
decline in overall quality of health care
available. . .
State Ex Rel Schneider v. Ligget, 576 P.2d 221, 229 (Kan.
1978) .
The existing insurance crisis will be exacerbated and
the practice of specialized medicine might well become an
uninsurable risk if the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions is tolled on such claims until an infant
reaches majority.
As stated by Judge David K. Winder:
Serious permanent injuries to children are
often cases of large potential damages. If
the period in which such claims could be
brought were tolled until the young child
reached the age of majority, a heavy burden
would be placed on insurance carriers in
evaluating and defending against the claim,
establishing appropriate reserve
requirements, and setting rates. The
percentage of medical malpractice claims
brought by minors is far from
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insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty
inherent in tolling the period in which
such claims may be brought could
drastically affect insurance rates that
least the segment of health care providers
that provide services exclusively to
minors.
Weighing the needs to contain malpractice
insurance costs and the need to insure the
availability of health care service crisis
against the competing interests of minors
and mental incompetencies, the parent as
guardian has failed to initiate an action,
is particularly appropriate for the
legislature, not the courts. The Utah
legislature has done so and the statutory
provision is reasonably related to
accomplish a legitimate legislative
purpose. The court therefore concludes
that the classification at issue does not
amount to a denial of equal protection.
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 157.
B. The malpractice statute of limitations
does not unconstitutionally deprive minor plaintiffs
of access to the courts.
The appellants in this case have challenged the
statute based on the open court's provision of the Utah
Const.

Art. I, Sec. 2.

The plaintiffs in Hargett v.

Limburg made an identical claim.

The court in Hargett

stated, however, that "that general isstue, however, is not
raised by the facts of this case.

Indeed, as discussed above,

the plaintiff in this action discovered the alleged legal
injury before the statute ran." Hargett, 598 F. Supp. 152,
155 (D.Utah 1984).
It is clear that the District Court for the district
of Utah held that since the parents of the minor child knew of
the injury prior to the time that the statute ran, the open
court's provision of the Utah Constitution did not apply.
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Such

are the facts in the instant case.

The appellants knew of the

alleged negligence almost immediately after it occurred.

Yet

those same individuals would now bring a cause of action twelve
years later based on the open court's provision.
Similarly, the appellants strongly argue that now
that their minor child has reached the age of majority, she
should have the opportunity under the open court's provision of
the Utah Constitution to bring an action in her own name.
However, it is a fact that Jennifer Chapman is, and will
continue to be mentally incompetent and therefore an action
must be brought by and through her guardians Teresa and
Robert Chapman.

It is also a fact that Teresa and Robert

Chapman are the same individuals that knew of the negligence
prior to the time the statute ran.

It is apparent, therefore,

that the guardians of Jennifer Chapman, having missed the
statute of limitations initially, are now attempting to take a
second bite of the apple, even though substantively there is
absolutely no difference between the individuals that should
have brought the action initially, and those that are now
attempting to bring the action.
Finally, it has been concluded by the United States
District Court for the District of Utah in Wheaton v. Jack,
Civ. No. C-82-0039, Slip Op. (D. Utah August 9, 1982), that
the statute in question does not violate the open court's
provision.
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CONCLUSION
As discussed above, plaintiffs1 actions against
defendant Myers fails for several reasons. First,
plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant Myers
because the defendant was not involved in any of the acts which
caused the harm to the plaintiff.

Specifically, defendant

Myers was not involved in either of the operations preceding
Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest, nor in the resuscitative
efforts following that coronary arrest.

The defendant's

involvement began the day after the coronary arrest, and
consequently, after the brain damage had been suffered by
Jennifer Chapman.
Second, it is clear from the testimony of Dr. Veasy
that the plaintiffs were well aware of the alleged acts of
negligence shortly after the negligent acts allegedly
occurred.

Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs had

notice of the possibility of a lawsuit and cannot now claim
that they were not aware of facts to support the possibility
of a lawsuit.
Third, although the plaintiffs allege that the
defendant Myer acted fraudulently to conceal information the
plaintiffs needed to know in order to initiate a lawsuit, the
plaintiffs fail to even suggest one instance in which the
defendant Myers said or did anything that could be construed to
be a fraudulent concealment.
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Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act and its accompanying statute of
limitations violates constitutional rights of equal protection
and access to the courts.

It is clear, however, that under the

"rational basis" standard of review, plaintiff's arguments must
fail.
Based on the above arguments, defendantsrespondents pray that this Court uphold the judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment and
dismissal.
DATED this /6

day of September, 1986.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

JL

G A R r D . SfOTT
GARY B. FERGUS (

MICHAEL L. SCHWAB
Attorneys for Respondent Myer
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Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT
CHAPMAN

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C85-6782
vs.
)

)

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, et al.,

) (HON> H. F. WILKINSON)
)
)

Defendants.

STATE OF WYOMING
COUNTY OF TETON

)

)
) ss
)
A-l

Robert
and

Chapman, being first duly sworn vnder oath

deposes

savs:
1.

The contents of this affidavit

upon information

are true except where stated

and belief and, as to such statements, I believe

them to be true and I am competent to testify ^s to the matters and
things

set forth
2.

herein.

I am one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled matter.

My

wife, Teresa, and I are the parents of Jennifer Chapman who was
born on August 10, 1972.
brain damaged.
irreversible

She is now 13 years old and is severely

She will never walk or talk and is permanently

disabled,

completely

upon others for all of her bodily
3.

incompetent,

and

wholly

and

dependent

functions.

During the first five months of her life, Jennifer experienced

several blue spells for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden,
Utah for treatment.

The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden

had not been able to properly diagnose the problem and then

sent

her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for specialized
care.

Dr. Veasy diagnosed ihe illness as a heart problem which he

attempted to cure with medication.

After medication failed to cure

the problem an operation was performed
Waterston shunt.
February

to install a device called a

The first shunt did not function properly and on

28, 1973, a second operation was performed

to adjust

the

shunt.
4.

Jennifer recovered from the anesthesia and we were

permitted to visit with her.
awake.

I observed that Jennifer was crying and

After some 20 to 30 minutes had passed my wife returned
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to visit her again and according to my wife she stayed in the room
and talked to the nurses for some 15-20 minutes.
according

During that time,

to my wife, a heart monitor machine attached to Jennifer

had gone off and was sounding an alarm.

The nurses in attendance

told my wife that the alarm was caused by difficulties
machine.

with the

My wife was in the room for 15-20 iminutes before the

nurses noticed
Emergenc}

that Jennifer

recussitative

was permanently
5.

was having

measures

saved

a coronary
Jennifers

arrest.

life,

but

her

brain

damaged.

My wife and I consulted with Dr. Veasy and representatives

of the Hospital.

During one of our meetings in 1982, Scott Olsen,

representing defendant

Scott Wetzel an affiliate

was present.

this meeting Dr. Veasv represented to my wife

¥l&wt
A

of the Home Group

and I that there were tests and records which indicated that the
cause of our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or shower of blood
clots that flooded her brain, and that he "knew fbr a fact" that the
blood clots had caused her injur), that this evejnt was unavoidable
and could have nothing to do with any negligence on the part of
anyone.

On the date of the,meeting Scott Olsen kdvised me that

Veasy and Dr. Meyers were "much too professional
up1' concering the cause of Jennifers
defendant

Wetzel

forwarded

Dr.

to cover anything

injuries. Following the meeting

a letter to us which

stated that

review of the case had shown that the cause of Jennifers'

their

injuries

was a blood clot which entered Jennifers brain and that her

injuries

were unrelated to anything which had been done by the Hospital.
Apparently

by accident, we received not only th£ letter which was

intended for us but a copy of the letter which was intended for the
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Hospitals' administrator, Charles Done, as well.
a written note which said "Charles;

That letter contained

this should get the Chapmans' off

your back — if they call you please refer them t]o me".

I confronted

Mr. Done with the letter and he told me that he was "embarrassed"
by it but did not deny that Wetzel had wrritten it or that Wetzel was
authorized
6.

to write

it.

We trusted and believed the defendants

statements

made

by

Wetzel-Home

Group)

and

(including

believed

that

the
Jennifers

injuries were due to blood clots and were unavoidable, until the
summer of 1984. when we received medical records of the Hospital
which related to Jennifer's
defendants, I discovered

injuries.

Contrary to the statements of the

that the medical

records did not contain any

test results which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's

injuries

and they showed uncertainty as to the cause of the injuries.

These

records

were therefore

statements
7.

in direct conflict

of the defendants

with the

aforesaid

to us.

Upon receiving the medical records in July of 1984 and after

talking to Dr. Veasy, I suspected that we had been deceived.
Therefore, we sought a second medical opinion.
January

of

1985 that we finally

lit was not until

discovered that the defendants

had

not given us full disclosure of the true cause of Jennifer's injuries and
very likely had misrepresented that to us.

At that time I discovered

that the cause of her injuries was probably not related to blood clots
and that the injuries were caused by a lack of oxygen which occurred
during the Hospital's delay in providing rescusitative care to her.
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8.
defendants

As a result of the statements of the defendants,
Wetzel-Home Group we delayed

in filing

including

a claim

against

the Hospital and in bringing this action.
DATED this jk day of May, 1986.

Robert
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / j

Chapman
day bf May, 1986.
) /

Notary

My

commission
- ~ ft

expires:

(1
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Publict

B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617
David B. Erickson - A3788
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN,
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,
AFFIDAVIT OF
L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D.

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a
hospital organized to do business
in the State of Utah; PRIMARY
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a
hospital organized to do business
in the State of Utah; INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; IHC
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation
dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or

present Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; GARTH
MEYERS, M.D.; L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D.,
KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.; SCOTT WETZEL
COMPANY a Utah corporation; THE
HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign
corporation; JOHN DOE I-X; and
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V,
Defendants.

on, McCenkl*
t BtMhncIl
•MBOIWI CoTnrawn

0 S 300 EAST
U.T LAKE CITY
UTAHWtn
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Civil No. C85-6782

jHON. HOMER F. WILKINSON)

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

The undersigned L. George Veasy, being first duly sworn
under oath deposes and says:
1.

I am a defendant in the abpve-entitled matter.

I

am a licensed physician and surgeon under the laws of the State
of Utah.
2.

In February 1973, on refertal from another doctor,

I was the admitting physician in connection with the hospitalization of Jennifer Chapman at Primary Children's Medical Center,
although I did not perform the two heart surgeries she underwent
during that admission.

Approximately six hours following her

second surgery Jennifer Chapman experienced a generalized seizure
(convulsion) following which her heart stopped (cardiac
arrest).

This episode left Jennifer Chapman immediately and

severely handicapped with both physical and mental impairments
for which she has been under continuous medical supervision and
care to this date.
3.

In the months and years immediately following the

episode in February 1973 that left her impaired, I have had many
discussions and considerable correspondence with Teresa Chapman
and Robert Chapman, parents of Jennifer Chapman.

On several

occasions they have alleged that medical negligence during her
hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center in February
1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition.
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4.

As an example and as evidence of such allegations

made by the Chapmans, I attach hereto as Exhibit "A" a copy of an
undated, hand-written letter from Robert Chapman to me which I
received sometime prior to May 2, 1977.

[For convenience, a

typed copy of said letter, without spelling or gramatical
corrections, is also attached.]
5.

Frequently since 1973 I have participated in

providing or coordinating medical care fbr Jennifer Chapman at
the request of her parents Robert Chapman and Teresa Chapman.
Based on my personal conversations and cbrrespondence with Teresa
and Robert Chapman, I know and state that continuously since 1973
they have believed, albeit erroneously, that the episode which
Jennifer Chapman experienced at Primary Children1s Medical Center
in February 1973 was preventable and resulted from medical
negligence by those who attended her.
6.

I am informed and believe that plaintiffs have

consulted with various attorneys concerning what they believed to
be a claim for medical negligence against one or more of the
defendants named above including, but probably not limited to,
the following attorneys:
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq.
22 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

November 1977

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq.
Salt Lake City, Utah

January 1979

[an additional Salt Lake City
attorney whose name is not
presently recalled]

1979 or 1980
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Jack C. Helgesen, Esq.
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C.
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

October 1984

Fred R. Silvester, Esq.
BLACK & MOORE
261 East Broaday
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

July 1985

Kathryn Collard
Attorney at Law
401 Boston Building

November 1985

Salt Lake City,

Utah

84111

Plus co-counsel from Wyoming
7.

November 1985

I do not believe there are any significant matters

learned by plaintiffs in July 1984 concerning the allegations in
the complaint herein that were not known to plaintiffs in 1977 or
which were not then readily discoverable by them through acting
with reasonable diligence on their strongly held belief that
Jennifer was injured by medical negligence in 1973.
8.

I declare the foregoing matters to be true of my

own knowledge except as to matters set ^orth upon information and
belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true.

L.XjGeorgd Vg£6y, M . D .
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

^

7 ^ day of

December, 1985.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

ton, McConkto
=>*«»on%i Corporation |
30 S 3QQ£AST
ALT LAKE CITY
UTAH^m
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CERTIFICATE OF MAltlNG
This is to certify that I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing

AFFIDAVIT OF L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D.,

by

depositing th$ same in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
on this the / ? ^ day of December, 1985 to the following:
Kathryn Collard, Esq.
401 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
P. Richard Meyer, Esq.
Robert N. Williams, Esq.
P. 0. Box 2608
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P. 0. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

J^TW^L

on, McConfcto
I Bu»hn*ll
MnurmCorpociOon
0 S 300 EAST
U.T LAKE CITY
UTAH S4111
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[Typed copy of Exhibit "A"]

Dr. George Veasy
Primary Childrens Hospital
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Dr. Veasy:
Some time ago I sat in your office and asked that you advise
me and help me to make a decission concerning a malpractice suite
in Jennifers behalf. Since that meeting I have given daily
thought and prayer as to which dirrection I should go in
providing Jennifer with security for the time she will be here on
earth. I am writing this letter so that you will have a better
understanding of our situation and why I am making the decision
that I am.
First of all in our meeting you seemed more concerned about
what our atorney would bennifit from the case rather than what
Jennifer could obtain. We sat and talked tor probably an hour
and a half and never once did you ask how Jennifer was doing.
You refered only to those damn lawers and the blood money that I
was seeking. I have pondered this in my hart daily sience that
meeting. I was raised in a religious home and taught honesty and
respect for working to obtain what we have* Our profit has
warned us against accepting filthy lucre and that money in of
itself is not evil but the honesty and (undecipherable) in which
we obtain it is the important fact.
I would at this time like to assure yOu that obtaining
filthy lucre or blood money as you have called it is not my
intention. I am not seeking to destroy any doctors or put a
hospital out of business. Insurance premiums our paid to protect
us all against hardship in this world. I have to insure my
business against fire, theftf and accident to protect me as a
business man. It is not something that only doctors pay.
What has brought me to the decision t0 go ahead with the
suite are two events that have happened in our lives and I would
like to explain them to you so you can understand our feelings.
First of all in our home we have living with us an uncle who
is mentally handicaped. We live with him to take care of his
needs and try to bring him some sort of happiness in this life.
We have now found it necessary to move aft^r five years of caring
for this man. We find that the cost of housing is increasing so
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rapidly and our family is growing to quickly that we have no
alternative but to get into our own home. In the nearly five
years we have been here not one relative has offered to help us
with this burden. We have become the center of jealousy and back
biting among religious people. Now that we are building our own
home it seems that no one wants the responsibility of caring for
Uncle Lynn. The fighting and accusing is already taking place.
It looks as though I might have to build 4 n extra room in our
basement to let him live in because no on^ wants him. I can not
in good conciance after what has happened here in the last five
years leave Jennifer as a burden to someories family if something
should happen to Teresa or I before she ig gone. The burdens and
responsibilities have been tremendous.
On Feb. 24th of this year my wife anc| our five children were
driving to pick me up from work when an Iriternational Scout went
out of control and ran into the back of our car. At this point
there were some minor injuries but everyone seemed to be okay.
Because of the impact the doors were jamedl and they could not get
out of the car. While they were waiting for help a semi truck
and trailer went out of control and hit th|(em again knocking them
a hundred and fifty feet down the highway and completely
demolishing our vehicle. When the police (arrived they found my
wife unconcious in the back seat of the car and my eight year old
boy administering first aid to Jennifer and our baby Cory. The
entire family had to be taken to the hospital and treated.
Teresa, Jennifer and Cory were admitted because of their
injuries. They were there for a period of five days before being
released. While they were there the nursep found it so difficult
to care for Jennifer that in five days theV fed her exactly 1/2
of one meal. That 1/2 of a meal took a nurse over 1-1/2 hours to
get down her. The rest of the meals were fed to her buy me. I
had to close up my business to care for heir. I takes a
tremendous amount of paciance to care for her and I can't leave
her to die in the hands of people who don't care for her and love
her the way we do. Because of the accident I realize how close I
came to losing my wife and children. Had Teresa been killed
Jennifer would have been left in this worl$ without the ability
to care for herself and it would be just a matter of time before
she would be back to the stage we brought her home from the
hospital in four years ago as doctor Myer put it, a vegetable.
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically or
legally to answer all the questions pertaiiiing to a malpractice
suite. The way I understand the law the burden of proof is on me
to prove both negligence and physical damage. The negligence is
obvious but to what extent the physical damage can be linked to
this negligence only a man of your medical knowledge can know for
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sure. I do know that besides being mentally and physically
handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarged heart making it
impossible for her to ever lead any kind of normal active life
and eventually will be the cause of her death. She was hurt and
hurt bad because of wrong decisions made in her early life. The
laws in the state of Utah allow for compensation for pain and
suffering. She suffered and felt pain fot the first five months
of her life only to be turned away by doctors that didn't have
time for little girls that could hold the^r breath. She felt
death in her soul at least twice a month and fought for her very
life only to have it completely destroyed. You told me if she
had died you would have been obligated to testify in her
behalf. A dead person feels no pain and suffering. She is
entitled to security for as long as she is willing to go on
struggling for her life. This case has to be weighed upon its
individual merits and not by what it costs for insurance for each
bed in a hopsital. I reemphasize that I am not seeking to
destroy anyone or collect a fortune in blopd money. The help
provided by the state and federal governments to the handicapped
are a mockery to the society we live in. They only provide
administrative moneys and do nothing for tpe individual
patient. I can no longer depend on other people to care for my
daughter. She is only loved in our home ahd the financial burden
is to great for me to bare alone. I don't know what Jennifers
future will bring but as her father I beg you to consider
Jennifer as an individual and not an insur&nce burden to each bed
in each hospital. Before too long my atorney will be in contact
with you and I ask that you realize that h0 represents Jennifers
interests and set aside your feeling toward the legal
profession. It is imparative that we have honest factual
answers.
I do hope that we can continue through life as the best of
friends and that I can alway intrust Jennifers life in your very
capable hands.
Sincerely,

Robert Chapitian
P.S.

Thanks for your t i m e .
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Ms. Kathryn Collard
Attorney at Law
401 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 534-1664
P. Richard Meyer
Robert N. Williams
Attorneys at law
165 West Pearl
Jackson,
Wyoming
(307) 733-5300
Attorneys
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Plainttiffs

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,

!
)
)

Plaintiffs,

vs.

)

AFFADAVIT OF TERESA
CHAPMAN

)

Civil No. C85-6782

I

) (HPN. H. F. WILKINSON)
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.

]
!

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

)
: ss.
)

The undersigned Teresa Chapman, being first duly sworn
under oath deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the plaintiffs in the above titled matter.

I am

competent to testify to the matters and things set forth in this
affidavit and things are true except those things which are set forth
on my information and belief and, as to those things, I believe them
to be true.
2.

My husband, Robert, I and are the parents of Jennifer

Chapman.
old.

She was born on August 10, 1972, and is now 13 years

Jennifer is severely brain damaged.

and is permanently disabled.

She will never walk, or talk,

She is completely incompetent, and

wholly dependent on others for all of her bodily functions.
3.

Jennifer, who seemed otherwise normal to us experienced

several^ blue spells in the first five months of her life.

My husband

and I took her to some doctors in Ogden, Utah for treatment of these
blue spells.

Those doctors failed to completly diagnose her condition

and they referred us to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital
for specialized
4.

treatment.

Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he

attempted to stabilize with medication u&til an operation could be
performed.

An operation was subsequently performed to install a

device called a Waterston shunt.

The first shunt did not function

properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was
performed to adjust the shunt.
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5.

After the second operation, Jennifer recovered from the

anesthetic and we were permitted to visit her.

She was crying and

awake when my husband and I left the room.
6.

About 10 to 15 minutes after leaving Jennifer's room, I

returned to visit her again. Several nurses were in the room. Jennifer
looked peculiar to me but I believed the nurses were on top of the
situation since they were standing with me by her beside observing
her.

One of the nurses was working with the heart monitoring

machine which was attached to Jennifer.

The elntire time I was in

the room the nurse kept fidgeting with the electrode leads on
Jennifers chest.

After

10-15 minutes had passed, the nurse told me

that an alarm on the heart monitor machine wks sounding. She told
me that the machine would not set properly and that she would have
to get someone to help her set it.

Before she lelft the room I asked

her whether the anesthetic was making Jennifer look peculiar.

She

then examined Jennifer and told me that Jennifer was in cardiac
arrest.

At that point, she signaled for help and other doctors and

nurses arrived shortly.

Emergency recussitative measures saved

Jennifer's life, but she became permanantly brftin
7.

damaged.

My husband and I consulted with our physician, Dr. Veasy,

in whom we had great trust, to see if he thought there had been
negligence on the part of the doctors in Ogden f<j>r failing to send our
daughter to him sooner.

I believed that Dr. Veajsy, the Head of

Cardiology at the defendant Hospital, spoke for the Hospital as well
as himself during our meetings with him.

He Represented to my

husband and I that there were tests and record^ which indicated that
the cause of our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or shower of

blood clots that flooded her brain and that he "knew for a fact" that
the blood clots had caused her injury.

In addition, he said that this

event was unavoidable and had nothing to do with any negligence on
the part of anyone.
8.

Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit

against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life.
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care.

Dr. Veasy was critical of

the delay on the part of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him
for care, but he persuaded us and our lawyers that he

knew for a

fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots, that it was
unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct.
recommended dismissal of the suit.

He

Based upon Dr. Veasy's

statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians.

At

that time and at all times up until July, 1954, we believed and
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us.
9.

After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy,

Meyers and the Hospital continued to provide treatment to Jennifer
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of anyone
caused Jennifer's brain damage.

No one associated with any of the

defendants ever told me that the nurse's statements to me, that the
heart monitor was functioning

incorrectly, were false.

10. We trusted and believed the defendants until the July of
1984, when we received medical records of the Hospital which

related to Jennifer's injuries.

Contrary to the statements of the

defendants, we discovered that the medical records did not contain
any tests results which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's
injuries. In fact they showed uncertainty as to the cause of the
injuries.

These records were therefore in direct conflict with the

statments of Dr. Veasy to us.
11.

In July of 1964, my husband and II confronted Dr. Veasy

about the medical records and their conflict v^ith his previous
statements to us.

He replied that the true cause of Jennifer's injuries

had never been established and he admitted that his prior
statements to us on this subject were assumptions on his part and
not the result of tests which had been performed on Jennifer.
12.

Upon receiving the medical records jn July of 1964 and

after talking to Dr. Veasy, I suspected that we had been deceived.
Therefore, we sought a second medical opinion.

It was not until

January of 1965 that we finally discovered that Dr. Veasy and the
other medical defendants had not given us full disclosure of the true
cause of Jennifer's injuries.

At that time, we discovered that the

cause of her injuries was probably not related to blood clots and that
the injuries were probably caused by a lack, oi oxygen which
occurred during the Hospital's delay in providing rescusitative care
to her.
12.

Since February 26, 1973,

we and Jennifer maintained a

continuing doctor-patient relationship with Dr. Veasy and the
Hospital until approximately March or April
received ongoing care from them.
between us and

1^65 and

Jennifer

The doctor-patient relationship

Dr. Meyers existed until approximately June, 1963.

During these periods Jennifer received treatment for her brain
damaged condition and its complications from all of these
defendants.
Dated this 16th day of January, 1986.

Teresa

Chapman

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1986.

Notary
My commission

expires:

Public

